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Abstract 
Donors’ concern with assessing multilateral organisations’ performance reflects an in-
creased focus on effectiveness and development results. The international community is 
addressing these issues as essential part of the common effort to achieve the internation-
ally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The paper proposes a taxonomy of 
four main purposes why bilateral agencies may consider multilateral performance assess-
ments. Unfortunately no single approach currently practiced is appropriate for all four 
purposes. It is suggested that bilateral agencies should not seek the one magic all-inclusive 
approach. While recognising the importance of donors’ political and administrative tradi-
tions, three types of donor systems are identified: (a) donors that “administrate multilateral 
performance”, (b) donors showing “management of multilateral performances” and (c) 
donors exercising “multilateral performance management”. In practice and with regard to 
harmonization, a modularised strategy seems to be a functional way to make multilateral 
performance assessment work for all. 
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1 Introduction 
The ‘results’ agenda in development 
In international development cooperation there is an increasing number of international 
initiatives and forces at work pushing and prodding development agencies in the direction 
of adopting management systems geared toward reform and above all, results. Since the 
Monterrey Conference of 2002, the development community – partner countries and do-
nors alike – has been focusing on managing its work so as to achieve the maximum devel-
opment results. This is not to say that development efforts never achieved results before 
2002, but what is new is a shared understanding of the need to think about results, and 
ways to achieve them, from the beginning of any initiative, enterprise, or project – and 
then to monitor progress and continue shaping the effort so that the desired results are ac-
tually achieved” (cf. OECD / World Bank 2006). 
The OECD/DAC Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results (JV MfDR)1 brings 
together bilateral development agencies, multilateral organisations and partner countries in 
order to promote the concept and practice of results-based management to its members 
and partners and develop shared values, methodological approaches and co-operation pro-
cedures. Managing for development results is one of the five basic principles of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in March 2005 (MfDR 2006). 
Why measure results of multilateral organisations? 
Multilateral organisations handle up to one third of global aid volumes and, in some cases, 
play a unique role in making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). There is a strong case for a growing multilateral system as an effective way to 
deliver the increased aid flows needed to reach the MDGs. The global partnership for re-
sults prompted by the Monterrey Consensus has also been changing the way development 
agencies work (CIDA 2003). The growing complexity and ongoing advances of the multi-
lateral system make it necessary for bilateral development agencies to adapt and further 
develop their policy accordingly, and deploy their resources so as to ensure effective and 
efficient collaboration in multilateral development efforts (SDC / SECO 2005). Many bi-
lateral development agencies are exposed to external and internal pressures for improved 
management of their engagement with multilateral organisations. Evidence on multilateral 
effectiveness is being called in from all directions2, e.g.: 
 to better inform multilateral policy, institutional strategy and financial allocation  
decisions; 
 to better exercise accountability and reporting to national constituencies; 
 to strengthen participation in the governance of multilateral organisations  
(e.g. at Board or Governing Body meetings); 
 to strengthen relationships with multilateral organisations at country level; 
                                                 
1 The JV MfDR is a subsidiary body of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. For more 
information see: http://www.mfdr.org/. 
2 See CIDA (2006a); DFID (2005b); MOPAN (2006). 
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 as input to joint advocacy by like-minded bilateral groups such as Utstein; 
 as input into wider debates about aid effectiveness. 
A major problem has been, that there have been no systematic, comparative, across-the-
board assessments of multilateral organisations carried out before, when the issue started 
to become prominent about 4–5 years ago. More fundamentally, there has been little inter-
national consensus on how such an assessment should be carried out. There has been little 
agreement on how to define multilateral effectiveness, far less on how to measure it (cf. 
DFID 2005a, 6). 
Is there influence from the private sector or relevant experience in government in 
general? 
In the history of international aid administration there have been different movements to 
introduce management instruments that help development agencies to check how well 
they do by emphasizing targets rather than processes and inputs (i.e. fiscal resources and 
personnel). The focus is no longer on activities and functions of the agencies but on the 
results they achieve. Since the 1990s, RBM is part of an effort to introduce private-sector 
management techniques into development agencies, driven by what came to be known as 
New Public Management (NPM) (Bouckaert / van Dooren 2003; Bouckaert et al. 2006, 1; 
CIDA 2003; Pollitt / Bouckaert 2004). 
Talbot (2005) emphasises the wider influence from the private sector and in particular the 
“quality” and “benchmarking” movements. Two well-known generic performance models 
are the Baldrich Awards (George 1992) and the Awards of the European Foundation of 
Quality Management (EFQM). Both Baldrige and EFQM models are annual snapshots of 
performance based on either examination by external assessors or self-assessment. They 
are meant to form the basis of subsequent improvement programs. One interesting differ-
ence between the two is the inclusion criteria for “corporate social responsibility” in 
EFQM in the form of an “impact on society” cluster. Talbot suggests, this may be due to 
the differences between the more free-market, liberal democratic traditions of the USA 
and more social democratic traditions in Europe (cf. ibid., 506). 
Over the past two decades there has been a trend within governments across the globe to 
reform and reshape the ways in which they function. There are increasing demands for 
government accountability for results, transparency, and provision of more efficient and 
effective services. Results-Based Management (RBM) has become a key feature in public 
agencies. By providing information on the degree to which agencies reach targeted outputs 
and outcomes, RBM introduces a means to check on performance and hold public agen-
cies accountable. The scope, sophistication and public visibility of performance measure-
ment activities are unprecedented (Bouckaert / Halligan 2006; Heinrich 2003, 25). 
What is new compared to former management approaches in development? 
It is not a new phenomenon that development agencies monitor and evaluate their own 
performance. Traditional RBM focuses on the monitoring and evaluation of inputs, activi-
ties, and outputs; that is, project program implementation. Development agencies have 
over time tracked their expenditures and revenues, staffing levels and resources, program 
and project activities, numbers of participants, goods and services produced, and so on. 
Performance-informed RBM combines the traditional approach of monitoring implemen-
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tation with the assessment of results. It is this linking of implementation progress with 
progress in achieving the desired objectives or goals (results) of development policies and 
programs that makes performance-informed RBM most useful as a tool for public man-
agement (cf. Kusek / Rist 2005, 301). 
RBM is different to traditional Project Cycle Management (PCM). PCM – by applying the 
Logical Framework Approach – is the process that begins with the initial conception of a 
development intervention and concludes with post-completion evaluation. The PCM still 
is a common practice among many DAC member countries (OECD 2005a, 86). PCM fo-
cuses on inputs and then analysing their potential impact. RBM in comparison focuses on 
desired development outcomes and identifies what inputs and actions are required to a-
chieve them. It shifts the emphasis to focus on the desired results and encourages flexibil-
ity and responsiveness in programming to achieve them.3 
What is the role of policy evaluation vis-à-vis performance management and RBM? 
The role of evaluation vis-à-vis performance management has not always been clear-cut: 
 policy evaluation tended to focus on programmes, to carry out episodic “one – off” 
studies and use more qualitative methods alongside quantitative ones (although there 
have been huge disputes about method) and its outputs were aimed more at policy; 
 performance measurement had a more organisational focus, tended towards setting up 
long-term continuous monitoring systems, relied slightly more on quantitative ap-
proaches and its outputs were aimed more at management (cf. Talbot 2006). 
In part, the differences are because evaluation was well established in many governments 
before the introduction of performance management and the new approaches did not nec-
essarily incorporate evaluation. A report by OECD (2001a) reveals that new performance 
management techniques were developed partly in response to perceived failures of evalua-
tion; for example, the perception that uses of evaluation findings were limited relative to 
their costs. Moreover, evaluation was often viewed as a specialized function carried out by 
external experts or independent units, whereas performance management, which involves 
reforming core management processes, was essentially the responsibility of managers 
within the organization. Failure to clarify the relationship of evaluation to performance 
management can lead to duplication of efforts, confusion, and tensions among organiza-
tional units and professional groups. Most OECD governments see evaluation as part of 
the overall performance management framework, but the degree of integration and inde-
pendence varies. Several approaches are possible: 
 At one extreme, evaluation may be viewed as a completely separate and independent 
function with clear roles vis-à-vis performance management. 
 At the other extreme, evaluation is seen not as a separate or independent function but 
as completely integrated into individual performance management instruments. 
                                                 
3 See CIDA (2003) and PARC http://www.iod.uk.com/. 
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 A middle approach – reflected in respective OECD best practice guidelines – views 
evaluation as a separate or specialized function, but integrated into performance man-
agement (OECD 2001a, 8). 
Challenges and dilemmas for Results-Based Management (RBM) 
For all its benefits, RBM is subject to a number of inherent unwanted dynamics that are 
difficult to counteract: (i) “creaming”, (ii) “teaching to the test” and the tendency to (iii) 
set low goals (Bouckaert et al. 2006, 8 ff.)4. 
Agencies and organizations subject to performance reporting may engage in “creaming” 
by selecting clients or cases that are easy to treat, thus ensuring high performance results. 
For example, an organization delivering health services which is evaluated based on the 
health of its clients may avoid taking on very ill clients. An organization evaluated based 
on the number of drug addicts treated successfully may avoid treating long-term addicts 
with poor prognoses for recovery. The same goes for schools. If schools can select their 
pupils, as private schools do, they have incentives to choose those who will likely perform 
well. 
RBM can lead organizations to “teach to the test” by focusing on those activities that con-
tribute directly to the achievement of performance goals, possibly leaving aside activities 
that are valuable for the common good but omitted from performance measurement. This 
dynamic can be observed in schools evaluated based on standardized tests. In order to a-
chieve high performance results, individual teachers or the school as a whole have an in-
centive to focus on teaching the material that will be tested, while leaving aside possibly 
valuable skills that are not part of the test. In the health care sector, professionals may ha-
ve greater incentives to treat symptoms rather than to alleviate the underlying causes of an 
illness or engage in prevention. 
A third unwanted dynamic is the potential tendency of agencies and organizations subject 
to RBM to set low goals in order to insure high performance. If possible, the agency or 
organization may avoid setting goals at all. In the field of education, this means that 
schools underestimate the ability to teach a certain number of students with a set budget 
(output) or when they underrate the rates of students expected to pass certain tests (out-
come). In the health sector, the tendency to set low goals may become visible when health 
organizations underestimate their capacity to treat a certain number of patients given their 
resources (outputs) or when they express limited expectations to treat health conditions 
(outcome).5 
2 Sisyphus’ job: measuring performance of multilateral organisations 
2.1 Multiple purposes: a taxonomy 
Multilateral performance assessment is not an end in itself. Why should bilateral devel-
opment agencies measure performance of multilateral organisations? There are two fun-
                                                 
4 On trade-offs, balances, limits, dilemmas, contradictions and paradoxes of public management reforms 
in general see Pollit / Bouckaert (2004). 
5 See also Bird et al. (2005). 
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damental rationales: (i) using the performance information to continuously improve a de-
velopment agency’s own organisation and management – i.e. the internal purpose, and (ii) 
a general need to document and demonstrate a development agency’s multilateral per-
formance in and with multilateral organizations to its domestic constituency such as par-
liament and the general public – i.e. the external purpose. 
Anyhow, with the up-scaling of the results agenda (e.g., Paris Declaration and the MDGs) 
the external purposes of multilateral performance assessment become extended beyond 
national spheres. Partner countries and the international community in general become 
additional target groups of development agency’s multilateral performance measures, 
leading to at least four key purposes in all (see table 1). 
The four purposes listed here are not all-inclusive and nor is it suggested that all of them 
appear in every bilateral development agency, simultaneously and equally. On the con-
trary, they have been erratic, patchy, and far from universal in their emergence with very 
few development agencies making an effort to adopt them all, several are taking up a se-
lected set and some hardly any of them at all (Behn 2003; Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2006; 
Talbot 2005, 496 ff.). 
Multilateral performance assessment as Public Management involves three essential di-
mensions. These again may be appreciated and connected by each development agency in 
its own way: 
(a) Improving the output efficiency of multilateral cooperation is perhaps the most 
traditional argument for the use of respective performance measures. It is a-
bout administrative control mechanisms inside development agencies (Hood et 
al. 1999) and about turning multilateral inputs into outputs. 
(b) Striving for allocation efficiency is a long-running argument in public man-
agement too. It is concerned with rational planning in development agencies’ 
budgeting process. Multilateral performance information, it is argued, is nec-
essary to understanding the utility of resources allocated to multilateral or-
ganisations. UK’s Public Service Agreements (PSA) are frequently referred to 
as highly developed applications in this tradition (Chancellor of the Exchequer 
2004)6. 
                                                 
6 See chapter 11, on DFID (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/F5D/2D/sr04_psa_ch11.pd). 
Table 1: Taxonomy of multilateral performance assessments 
Purposes of multilateral performance assessments  Target group 
Multilateral performance assessment as Public Management 
(a) as output efficiency 
(b) as allocation efficiency 
(c) as effectiveness 
Development Agency 
Multilateral performance assessment as Public Accountability Domestic constituency 
Multilateral performance assessment as Client Service Partner countries 
Multilateral performance assessment as Global Public Value International community 
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(c) In a way, increased emphasis on effectiveness has emerged as a reaction to the 
efficiency position. The argument shifts the focus to outcomes and impact of 
development agencies’ multilateral policy. It is suggested that development 
agencies have concentrated on the task of implementing (isolated) multilateral 
activities efficiently, at the cost of loosing sight of the overall aims of devel-
opment policy – i.e., the eventual outcomes or development results achieved 
as well as better coordination within the whole organizational system of de-
velopment agency7 (OECD / World Bank 2006; Talbot 2005). 
Multilateral performance assessment as Public Accountability suggests that general public 
need to be given information not just about what is spent on multilateral cooperation but 
also what results are achieved. Development agencies have mixed policies on how much 
and in what detail information is published. It became common practice however, that 
development agencies publish annual reports including regular information on multilateral 
cooperation. 
Multilateral performance assessment as Client Service is linked to the Paris Declaration which 
lays down a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its im-
pact on development. The 56 partnership commitments are organised around the five key 
principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual ac-
countability. Addressing these principles and monitoring the related set of 12 indicators of 
aid effectiveness is linked to notions about better partner services by overcoming lack of 
coordination and strengthening mutual accountability. This purpose focuses on “excel-
lence” and baselines to be employed in multilateral performance assessments (OECD 
2006a; World Bank 2006a). 
Multilateral performance assessment as Global Public Value is the most recent argument 
linked to the MDGs. It suggests that multilateral organisations have a more positive role in 
creating global public value which cannot be made by bilateral development agencies. 
Considering this added value in multilateral performance assessments usually reflects in 
general a more positive attitude to multilateral organisations achievements and mandate. 
This argument is pressed ahead and beyond multilateral organisations as only provides of 
‘regional and public goods’ (Kaul 2004; Ferroni / Mody 2002) by addressing the role and 
performance assessment of global public policies and programs (OECD / World Bank 
2007; World Bank 2004). 
Unfortunately, no single performance measure is appropriate for all four purposes. Conse-
quently, development agencies should not seek the one magic performance assessment 
approach. Instead, they need to think about the strategic purposes to which multilateral 
performance assessment might contribute and how they might deploy these measures. On-
ly then can they select and harmonise measures with the characteristics necessary to help 
achieve each purpose. Without at least a tentative policy about how multilateral perform-
ance measures can be employed to foster effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, devel-
opment agencies will be unable to decide what should be assessed and how to harmonise 
procedures (cf. Behn 2003; compare also, Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2006). 
                                                 
7 E.g. IFI- vs. UN- vs. Global Programs-units, bilateral vs. multilateral units, headquarter vs. field offices. 
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2.2 Diverse practices: an international comparison 
The following section and related annexes are for the most part based on findings of 2 
recent studies. ODI’s synthesis report on Relationships of other donor organisations with 
multilaterals (ODI 2005) and the survey on Bilateral Methodologies for Assessing Multi-
lateral Performance, commissioned by CIDA (2006b). The Canadian survey – very simi-
lar to ODI’s study – had two key objectives: 
 Identify donor countries’ current methodologies. Asking and comparing donors on the 
importance attached to methodologies, the basic nature of methodology, current flaws 
in the flow of information originating from multilateral organisations, and the weight 
given by bilateral donors to various considerations in allocation of resources. 
 Elicit donor countries’ views concerning the future. Both studies address issues such 
as the need for consensus among donors regarding indicators, the feasibility of a stan-
dard framework in this respect, the type of groupings of multilateral organisations that 
may be required to facilitate standardization, and similar concerns. 
At present, three avenues including eight different approaches of multilateral performance 
assessment may be differentiated: (i) the joined-up avenue showing approaches involving 
several donors or development agencies with a focus on harmonisation, (ii) the bilateral 
avenue including specific approaches adopted by individual donors, and (iii) the comple-
mentary avenue having approaches that address perceived deficiencies of both joined-up 
and bilateral approaches (see, table 2): 
 The Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) 
 The Common Performance Assessment System (COMPAS) 
 The British Multilateral Effectiveness Framework (MEFF) 
 The Canadian Multilateral Evaluation Relevance and Assessment system (MERA) 
 The Danish Multilateral Monitoring Survey System (MMS) 
 The Dutch Performance Management Framework (PMF) 
 The New Approach 
 The Client Surveys 
Table 2: 3 avenues of multilateral performance assessment 
Joined-up 
avenue 
Bilateral 
avenue 
Complementary 
avenue 
 MOPAN 
 COMPAS 
 MEFF 
 MERA 
 PMF 
 MMS 
 New Approach 
 (Client Surveys) 
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The Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)8 
MOPAN is a network of nine “like minded” donor countries, which includes Austria, Ca-
nada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, who share, among other things, a commitment to strengthening and supporting 
the multilateral system. France is about to join as 10th member.9 MOPAN conducts a joint 
Annual Survey of multilateral organizations’ partnership behaviour with national stake-
holders and other donor organizations at country level. Each year, the Annual Survey cov-
ers 3–4 multilateral organisations and is conducted in 8–10 countries. A Country Report is 
produced in each of these countries and a Synthesis Report brings together all the results. 
The Secretariat function rotates among the MOPAN members annually. 
Since 2003 MOPAN has conducted an Annual Survey on selected multilateral organisa-
tions in a number of countries where MOPAN members have Embassies or country of-
fices. As a rolling exercise, the Annual Survey should, over time, be able to cover most of 
the major development. The first Annual Survey was implemented in 2003 as a pilot sur-
vey followed by three full fledged Annual Surveys in 2004, 2005 and 200610. The Synthe-
sis Reports for these Annual Surveys are available from MOPAN members. The stated 
objectives are: 
 Better information and understanding of multilateral organisations, their roles and per-
formance by decision makers concerned, parliamentarians and the general public in 
MOPAN member countries, 
 better informed dialogue with the multilateral organisations, both at headquarters and 
at country level, 
 engagement of MOPAN country offices in the assessment of multilateral performance 
and, 
 improved overall performance of multilateral organisations at country level. 
MOPAN’s assessment is an opinion survey, eliciting the informed judgment of MOPAN 
member embassy or country office staff. Country-level staff members surveyed are asked 
to give their perceptions on the performance of different organizations relative to their 
respective mandates in the countries in which they serve. MOPAN surveys focus on the 
quality of national partnership (contribution to policy dialogue, advocacy etc); and inter-
agency partnership (information sharing, interagency coordination). The final report in-
cludes findings from individual questionnaires, agency templates, country team discus-
sion, country reports and a synthesis report. 
Members refer to no direct effects on budget decisions as the MOPAN is expected to be 
used alongside other evidence-based exercises such as internal evaluations by the organi-
sations themselves, and external (e.g. multi-donor) evaluations. Financing decisions are 
complex and rely on a number of factors. 
                                                 
8 See annexes 2 and 3. 
9 Germany, although member of the Utstein Group, not actively participates in MOPAN. 
10 The MOs selected for the 2006 MOPAN survey are UNICEF, ILO and ADB. The exercise took place in 
the following countries: Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Colombia, and Guatemala. 
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Perceptions are useful if they are based on informed judgements, which in this case are 
formed on the basis of day-to-day interactions with the multilateral organisations. Many 
MOPAN members work with these organisations through co-financing or participation in 
joint initiatives and donor meetings. They have an opportunity to observe multilateral or-
ganisations’ partnership behaviour directly. The survey asks only about behaviour that is 
observed by MOPAN members. The MOPAN members’ joint group discussion provides a 
mechanism for testing individual views and pooling information. A weakness is referred 
to some cases in which MOPAN participants may have limited knowledge of the multilat-
eral organisations. 
Among the positive spin-offs for members the most important ones are referred to the in-
creased knowledge at country level of the way multilateral organisations operate, the shar-
ing (at country and headquarter level) of experiences in working with multilateral organi-
sations, and the shared understanding at MOPAN headquarter level of each others’ poli-
cies and practices regarding the multilateral agenda. In an effort to promote transparency 
and dialogue among stakeholders, MOPAN has asked multilateral organisations to provide 
their feedback on survey conclusions, and posts it on their websites together with the  
MOPAN Survey Report. 
The MOPAN monitoring exercise is supposed to remain a light and rapid exercise. It is 
organised to keep transaction costs for all concerned as low as possible, without under-
mining the validity of the assessments (MOPAN 2006, 39). MOPAN is considered as “the 
only game in town for effective donor harmonisation”. At the same time, the flexible net-
work arrangement (e.g. rotating secretariat roles among members) is seen as potential 
challenge of “who speaks for MOPAN” when enhancing harmonisation with other initia-
tives. 
The Common Performance Assessment System (COMPAS)11 
In the past, international financial institutions have, largely focused on inputs and proc-
esses rather than on development outcomes. Moving to a results management agenda will 
require a shift in institutional practices – which has only just begun with the new efforts to 
develop a common performance measurement system (COMPAS) and integrating Man-
agement for Development Results into multilateral development banks’ practices (World 
Bank 2006c, xix). COMPAS is devised by the MDBs and aims to provide managers and 
shareholders of the MDBs with a common source of information on how MDBs are con-
tributing to development results. 
This first COMPAS report – published by ADB in 200612 – provides the initial basis for a 
framework for collecting consistent and comparable information on how the MDBs are 
implementing managing for development results (MfDR). The MDBs have succeeded in 
drafting a set of common indicators that may form the basis of future reporting by them 
(CIDA 2006b). It is based on seven categories of data: (a) country-level capacity devel-
opment, (b) performance-based concessional financing, (c) country strategies; (d) projects 
                                                 
11 See annexes 4 and 5. 
12 Multilateral Development Banks' Working Group on Managing for Development Results (2006). 
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and programs, (e) monitoring and evaluation, (f) learning and incentives, and (g) inter-
agency harmonization. 
Analysis of data in the first COMPAS report suggests overall progress in the implementa-
tion of the MfDR agenda. Awareness of results is increasing, and frameworks, systems, 
and procedures are being implemented in all the institutions. The degree of institutionali-
zation of the MfDR agenda, however, varies across its dimensions and among MDBs. Al-
though the design, approval, and implementation of new procedures and systems at the 
institutional level is likely to take time, a key challenge for all MDBs will be to go beyond 
the introduction of such systems and procedures and to establish an institutional culture of 
using the information on results to inform decision making. Below is a summary of the 
progress and challenges in each of the three pillars of the COMPAS (cf. World Bank 
2006c, 107). 
The British Multilateral Effectiveness Framework (MEFF)13 
During 2003–2004, DFID set up the MEFF for assessing and monitoring the institutional 
effectiveness of international organizations it funds. The system was developed internally 
and DFID staff conducted the assessments. Twenty-three organisations have been as-
sessed. MEFF’s key objectives include to: 
 Provide information to strengthen DFID’s accountability under its Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) objectives 
 Provide inputs to DFID’s institutional strategies for engagement with multilaterals, 
 Provide inputs to future financing decisions 
The MEFF focuses on eight corporate management systems (i.e. corporate governance, 
corporate strategy, resource management, operational management, quality assurance, 
staff management, monitoring, evaluation and lessons learning, and reporting of results. 
The measurement system covers three elements: internal performance, focus on country-
level results, and partnership. It uses three main assessment instruments, comprising a 
checklist of indicators, expressed as questions; a scorecard rating data in the checklists; 
and a summary report, providing a brief, qualitative review of an organization’s accom-
plishments. The framework is designed to be applicable to all multilateral organizations, 
but recognizes the need to differentiate among different groupings: multilateral develop-
ment banks, UN development organizations, UN standard-setting organizations, humani-
tarian organizations, coordinating organizations and the European Commission. 
The Multilateral Effectiveness Framework is coming closest to a comprehensive meas-
urement approach. Some respondents of the survey by CIDA (2006b) expressed concerns 
that the selected groupings of multilateral organisations contain some overlap (e.g. UNICEF 
is both a development and a humanitarian organization), or may not allow sufficiently for 
the measurement of individual characteristics. 
CIDA’s survey study revealed general respect for MEFF among donor countries, and most 
respondents considered it to be a good starting point for progress towards the building of 
                                                 
13 See annexes 6 and 7. 
Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment 
German Development Institute  11 
consensus and a harmonized approach towards measurement. At the same time, MEFF is 
suspected that it could lead to a somewhat mechanisic approach to funding allocations 
(ODI 2005). 
The Canadian Multilateral Evaluation Relevance and Assessment (MERA)14 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has developed a standard tem-
plate of questions called the Multilateral Evaluation Relevance and Assessment system, 
MERA. The purpose is: 
 To better inform policy and financial allocation decisions on more solid evidence. Ul-
timately, CIDA aims at getting more predictable multi-year funding, and an adequate 
balance between core and responsive/earmarked funding. 
 To better exercise CIDA’s accountability and improve it’s reporting to Canadian citi-
zens. 
 For more effective Board meetings and better identification of areas requiring im-
provements. 
 To deliver on MPB commitment to complete the Multilateral effectiveness review, as 
part of the Agency Aid Effectiveness agenda (CIDA 2006c). 
MERA covers three different themes: relevance, effectiveness and improvement measures 
in the management. Multilateral organisations will be rated on a scale of 1 to 5 for each of 
the 3 themes. MERA provides a framework for comparing multilateral organisations re-
ceiving core funding within each Directorate. Assessments will be based on the submis-
sions made by Program Managers of the MERAs, supplemented by additional informa-
tion, such as the institutions reports, the field surveys, any reports indicating results 
achieved. The next step is said to review the current level of funding to these multilateral 
organisations and propose a new allocation, as required. 
Under “relevance”, the measurement includes the links to the MDGs and role in the inter-
national architecture. Measurement of improvements relate to those driven by donors or 
recipients, as well as general improvements. The template is applicable to all multilateral 
organisations but is considered to suffer from a serious lack of detail. Finally, MERA is 
regarded as an interim system requiring elaboration and specificity while awaiting a more 
harmonized and internationally agreed methodology (CIDA 2006b). 
The Danish Performance Management Framework (PMF)15 
In 2003, DANIDA developed a Performance Management Framework (PMF). The objec-
tives of PMF are to: enhance the quality of Danish development cooperation through 
stronger focus on results (Danida 2005a); improve management and continuous learning, 
through better information and reporting; and strengthen accountability through perform-
ance assessments and measurement in the context of an increasingly decentralized man-
agement structure. PMF highlights bilateral and multilateral agencies’ respective monitor-
ing and evaluation objectives, key management documents, methodology and source of 
                                                 
14 See annex 8. 
15 See annex 9. 
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information and reporting responsibilities at the corporate, country (Danida 1991) and 
sector levels. PMF enables bilateral and multilateral agencies to track their progress in 
meeting agreed-upon monitoring and evaluation standards. 
The Danish Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) includes a number of tools 
such as analysis of organizational strategies, perception analyses (own embassies and 
through MOPAN), and assessments of multilateral organisations’ evaluation and reporting 
systems. In the measurement of both organizational practices and field level results, the 
PMF relies on the objectives, targets and indicators established by the relevant organiza-
tions themselves as set out in the organization’s own vision and strategies. (CIDA 2006b; 
Danida 2005b). 
In addition, Danida’s Evaluation Department has been piloting a “New Approach” (see 
below). This new approach reviews the extent to which RBM principles form the basis of 
the work of monitoring and evaluation units within the multilateral organisations. The 
approach adopts the principle that measurement of multilateral organisations should be 
based increasingly upon the evidence and documentation produced by the organisations’ 
own monitoring and evaluation systems (CIDA 2006b). 
The Dutch Multilateral Monitoring System (MMS)16 
The Multilateral Monitoring Survey (MMS) is an annual updated performance assessment 
for the most important UN institutions and International Financial Institutions at country 
level of the 36 Dutch partner countries. Primary sources of information for the Multilateral 
Monitoring Survey (MMS) were the Beoordelingskader (BOK) questionnaires of 2002 
and 2003 answered by embassy, permanent representation of mission, and constituency 
offices staff. Staff and peers are asked to comment on a number of specific questions en-
capsulating corresponding indicators (e.g. good governance, poverty reduction, account-
ability and financial management, relevance to Dutch policies and strategies, etc.)(CIDA 
2006b). 
The New Approach17 
In January 2004, DANIDA tabled a proposal to the DAC Evaluation Network for a “New 
Approach” to evaluating multilateral assistance.18 The “New Approach” calls for strength-
ening multilaterals’ pre-existing RBM and evaluation systems, with the goal of enabling 
bilateral donors to depend on multilaterals’ own results reporting for performance assess-
ments. 
In order to determine whether a multilateral agency’s own central evaluation office has 
produced, or is capable of producing, evaluations that are credible, valid and useable (i.e. 
comparable to evaluations that are commissioned through an independent multi-donor 
evaluation), the “New Approach” proposes to first assess: i) the independence of a multi-
lateral organization’s evaluation systems; ii) credibility of the evaluation process; and iii) 
                                                 
16 See annex 10. 
17 See annex 11. 
18 See Danida (2006a), furthermore a comparable exercise with UNICEF (DFID 2006). 
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use of evaluation evidence by these agencies, beneficiary countries’ and bilateral partners. 
This assessment is carried out by a Peer Panel. Since the proposal of the “New Approach”, 
DANIDA has conducted one evaluation of the UNDP in 2005 (Danida 2006b; UNDP 
2006). CIDA has taken the lead in conducting an evaluation of UNICEF using the “New 
Approach” in 2006 (UNICEF 2006a; 2006b). 
Intermediate summary: comparative strengths and weaknesses of current practices 
The CIDA survey sums up that there was virtual unanimity about the key justification for 
multilateral performance measurement: multilateral organisations’ accountability. Aside 
from accountability, respondents all agreed that performance measurement allowed the 
identification of strengths and weaknesses as a necessary basis for corrective action. Many 
mentioned also that measurement is important to maintain public support for the multilat-
eral system. Donors also feel that, although an important consideration in budgetary plan-
ning, measurement is not the only criterion in determining the level and type of financial 
and technical support. 
Method of measurement among development agencies vary considerably in sophistication. 
At least half of respondents reported that they did not have a defined methodology as 
such, and relied on a “considered weighing of strengths and weaknesses”. Two respon-
dents reported the use of specific indicators: (i) the UK’s Multilateral Effectiveness Fra-
mework (MEFF) which classifies the multilaterals into separate groupings according to 
functionality and provides process indicators designed for each; and (ii) the Canadian 
Multilateral Evaluation Relevance and Assessment (MERA) which calls for measurement 
of all multilaterals against a limited set of generic indicators. Both Denmark’s Perform-
ance Management Framework (PMF) and the Dutch Multilateral Monitoring System 
(MMS) employ a measurement process relying on feedback from representatives in the 
field following specific questions complemented with consultations. The Common Per-
formance Assessment System (COMPAS) by the Multilateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) is well advanced in the definition of indicators” (CIDA 2006b, vi). 
Sources of information for measurement by donors include, in order of importance, joint 
donor evaluations of multilateral projects or programs, monitoring and evaluation reports 
produced by the multilaterals themselves, project-specific field reports and the delibera-
tions of Governing Boards. Of lesser importance in this respect are financial audit reports 
and financial statements. Feedback from the Multilateral Organizations Performance As-
sessment Network (MOPAN) has become an important source of information for many 
donors. 
There appears to be much agreement about current challenges in the field of performance 
measurement. Many respondents mentioned the inadequate reporting on the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). They are keenly aware of the gaps in MO reporting on re-
sults in the field. They recognize the need for independent means for evaluating the accu-
racy and findings of evaluation reports. Without exception there is great interest in har-
monization of measurement approaches in line with the Paris Declaration. Measurement 
of the extent to which programs have been aligned with partner governments is important. 
The above challenges indicate the general scope for a strategy to enhance measurement 
practices. Key components of such a strategy include increased attention to the quality of 
monitoring and evaluation practices of the multilaterals themselves in order to make them 
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more results oriented. Reporting by the multilaterals should reflect on progress towards 
the MDGs, analyze the extent of alignment of programs with the recipient country’s own 
strategies, and indicate application of lessons learned. A well-coordinated process of har-
monization of measurement systems among donors would reduce transaction costs and 
allow donors to form a common front towards change. In addition, some type of institu-
tional arrangement would be useful to assess independently the accuracy of performance 
measurement in order to reduce the “evaluation gap”. 
Perhaps the most striking result of the survey was the unanimity in feeling that harmoniza-
tion of measurement practices is of first priority. It would be in line with the Paris Decla-
ration; it would avoid overburdening organizations with a multitude of donor-specific in-
dicators; it would be an important means of exercising leverage and ensuring greater ef-
fectiveness; and, as mentioned, it would reduce transaction costs (Martens et al. 2001; 
Martens 2005; Ostrom et al. 2005). 
3 Achille’s heel: managing performance in development agencies 
Performance assessment and management can resolve certain problems but also create 
new problems (cf. Bouckaert / Peters 2002, 359). Having a range of new management 
practices in place with inadequate or even counterproductive performance assessment and 
management systems may be worse than having had no reform at all. Implementing an 
inadequate system of performance management can provide a false sense of security and 
accomplishment and in the process may misdirect resources and activities. Paradoxically, 
therefore, inadequate performance management can become the Achilles’ heel of devel-
opment agencies’ results agenda itself. 
3.1 Four types of performance management approaches 
In order to make meaning of the diverse uses and combinations of multilateral perform-
ance assessment frameworks, a typology of four models may be used which has been de-
veloped by Bouckaert / Halligan (2006, 446 ff.). The model considers three components: 
(i) performance measurement without management, (ii) management of performance of 
specific functions and (iii) performance management. 
Based on the logical sequence of, firstly, collecting and processing performance data into 
information; secondly, integrating it into documents, procedures, and stakeholder dis-
courses; and thirdly, using it in a strategy of improving decision-making, results, and ac-
countability, four ‘pure’ models have been constructed by the two authors (see table 3). 
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How DAC members’ or individual development agencies’ institutional differences impact 
on shaping multilateral performance policies and practice is an area which has often been 
ignored. Only ODI’s (2005) comparative survey included ‘institutional’ dimensions, such 
as differences in the role of parliaments or in the engagement style of bilateral donors. The 
four models distinguished by Bouckaert and Halligan can be applied to the historical and 
institutional development of performance and management systems as a basis for com-
paratively analysing and effectively harmonising DAC members’ orientations to multilat-
eral organisation performance assessments.19 
Model 1 is termed traditional/pre-performance and essentially recognises that multilateral 
performance objectives in a generic sense can be found in most systems of development 
agency, but that many of them might be regarded as pre-modern management. In these 
cases, the expectation is that multilateral performance would be generalised and diffuse, 
with goals not defined in terms of performance as such as it arises where assessment and 
management are present. Input driven development agencies, within law-based systems 
focusing on procedure and due process, may have a very implicit interest in multilateral 
performance. Scarcely available data may not have an information value, will not be inte-
grated, and hardly will be usable. 
Under model 2, performance administration, a commitment to multilateral assessment and 
management is expected, but the relationship may not be explicit or well developed and 
the application is often ad hoc. The performance administration model focus on multilat-
eral assessment is inclined to be technically oriented but the level of coherence may de-
pend on which generation of assessment system is under discussion. In respective devel-
opment agencies is an intuitive and generalised concern for multilateral performance that 
is registered and administered. Multilateral organisation performance assessment becomes 
                                                 
19 See also Bouckaert’s earlier comparative research and typologies of results-based management systems 
within OECD (OECD 1997; Beuselinck 2006; Campbell 2004). 
Table 3: Four models of performance 
 Model 1: 
Traditional/Pre-
Performance 
Model 2: 
Performance  
Administration 
Model 3: 
Management of 
Performances 
Model 4: 
Performance  
Management 
1. Measuring Intuitive Administrative data 
registration 
Specialised per-
formance meas-
urement systems 
Hierarchical per-
formance measure-
ment system 
2. Integrating None Some Within different 
systems for specific 
management func-
tions 
Systematically 
integrated 
3. Using None Limited Disconnected Coherent, inte-
grated, comprehen-
sive, consistent 
4. Limitations Functional un-
awareness 
Ad hoc selective Incoherence Sustaining complex 
system 
Source: Bouckaert / Halligan (2006, 446) 
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another administrative procedure that may be part of an administrative and legal setting, 
not a managerial or policy context. Multilateral information generated from these adminis-
trative procedures is disconnected from improvement strategies. Sophisticated rules de-
veloped for registering and administering multilateral performance (e.g. institutional 
strategies) are not developed to generate information to affect managerial functions nor 
elements of a policy or program cycle. 
Figure 1: Relationship between measuring, integrating, and using performance in the evolving 
models 
 
Sources: Adapted from OECD (2001b, 12) and Bouckaert / Halligan (2006, 448) 
Model 3 is a quite complex type, entitled managements of performances. It arises where 
management and performance have been linked but the connection between them is un-
derdeveloped and concurrent systems operate. Managing performances includes multilat-
eral performance assessment but goes beyond its administration. It implies different types 
of performances according to different and unconnected management functions. This re-
sults in a divers range of managements of performances, like performances in partnership 
management, financial management (budgets, audits), strategic and operational manage-
ment on country-level. 
A diverging set of performance measurement systems is feeding information into a dis-
connected set of management functions, resulting in different multilateral performances 
for different purposes, which are not necessarily linked in a hierarchical and logical way. 
A symmetrical development of these function-based multilateral measurement systems 
make it not very consistent, coherent, comprehensive, and integrated between these func-
tions. However, within some functions there may be a high level of sophistication and 
development, even up to driving an improvement and reform process in other functions. 
Accountability-based performance may drive organisational learning and allocation or 
vice versa. 
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2. Identifying indicators
3. Setting targets
4. Monitoring results
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results
6. Integrating evaluation
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The Model 4, performance management, is defined by the presence of distinctive features: 
coherence, integration, consistency, convergence, and comprehensiveness. It includes a 
solid multilateral performance measurement system beyond administration and prolifera-
tion. It includes an integration of performance information, which goes beyond ad hoc 
connectedness, for the purpose of using it in a coherent management improvement strat-
egy. It considers different performance assessment systems for different purposes, which 
are (hierarchically) connected. The performance management model also requires an ex-
plicit policy on assessment and managing the different functions and their performances. 
3.2 Donor readiness assessment for multilateral performance assessment 
The last 5 years saw the mushrooming of multilateral performance assessment frame-
works. Current emphasis by development agencies on joined-up approaches and harmoni-
sation signal a period of performance expansion and management consolidation. A pur-
pose of the four ideal types is to use them as a basis for examining the variations in the 
orientation of the development agency systems to multilateral performance management. 
The importance of the donor countries’ and their respective development agencies’ cul-
tural and administrative traditions is recognised. 
The success of RBM systems depends on the contextual conditions in which they are un-
dertaken and implemented. Kusak and Rist, who work for the World Bank on such sys-
tems, suggest asking eight “readiness” questions for what they call “Results-based Man-
agement and Evaluation Systems” (Kusek / Rist 2002; Kusek / Rist 2004; Kusek / Rist / 
White 2005). Their questions inquire about the pressures and advocates calling for RBM, 
the motives of the RBM champion, the beneficiaries of the system, the capacities to sup-
port RBM, the way in which the system will help meet program goals, the way it will deal 
with negative information and how it will be linked to reaching national goals. 
RBM reforms prolong in many OECD countries, mainly in English- and Scandinavian-
speaking parts of the world. These countries have substantial experience with introducing 
a results focus and are either implementing or contemplating a new generation of results 
reforms. Other OECD member countries, especially those with strong legal traditions such 
as France and Germany, have only recently embarked on such reforms. In Germany most 
of these RBM reforms are taking place and are limited to the local level (Kusek / Rist 
2005, 304). 
Table 4: RBM ideal types and OECD/DAC donor systems 
 Pre/Proto 
Performance 
Managing 
Performances 
Unsystemic 
Traditional: 
 ---- 
Managements of Performances: 
 Denmark 
 Netherlands 
Systemic 
Performance Administration: 
 Germany 
 
Performance Management: 
 Canada 
 UK 
Source: Adapted from Bouckaert / Halligan (2006, 451) 
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Performance administration: Germany 
Germany’s multilateral ODA usually accounts for about a third of total gross ODA but 
was higher in 2004 (42 %) due to a large contribution to the World Bank. In an increas-
ingly globalised world, Germany attaches growing importance to multilateral co-
operation. The last OECD/DAC Peer Review on Germany (OECD 2006c) states, that in 
order to better focus on the effectiveness of multilateral organisations, BMZ intends to 
monitor their progress in implementing the internationally agreed upon development a-
genda, including the fight against poverty and the MDGs at the field level. The internal 
reorganisation of BMZ in 2003, which combined multilateral, bilateral and sectoral re-
sponsibilities across the ministry, has enhanced the consistency between multilateral and 
bilateral policy making. The shift towards greater focus on performance assessment has 
not yet been used to guide levels of financial contributions to multilateral agencies. Ger-
many has traditionally supported the European Community (EC) and IFIs but recognises 
that UN agencies deserve greater support given the role they should play on global issues. 
This increased focus on multilateralism has yet to be accompanied by similar levels of 
strategic thinking and performance monitoring. An immediate implication for the in-
creased multilateral focus is, therefore, the formulation of a clear multilateral strategy, and 
an organised approach involving Germany’s implementing agencies which more system-
atically tracks the performance of the multilateral institutions (cf. ibid). 
The ‘legal state’ or Rechtsstaat is a key element in the German administrative system. It is 
characterized by the classical bureaucratic model with strong emphasis on legality and 
proper fulfilment of regulatory functions (Ordnungsaufgaben). Only few reform initiatives 
are reported at the federal level (Flynn / Strehl 1996). German changes with regard to new 
management ideas in government reform (e.g., RBM) are characterized more by adminis-
trative tightening-up and modernization. According to Pollitt / Bouckaert (2004, 257) the 
German trajectory has been marked rather by incrementalism (‘permanent flexibility of 
institutional frameworks’) than by fundamental change (Benz / Götz 1996, 5; Knill 2001), 
and more by improvement of the existing system rather than an import of other systems 
(König 1997). 
Accordingly, the DAC Peer Review criticizes greater emphasis on the performance of 
multilateral organisations could be better translated into a funding allocation policy. The 
review recommends a more adequate framework for multilateral co-operation, encompass-
ing global funds, based on a methodology that includes an assessment of effectiveness, 
preferably in collaboration with other donors. Preliminary analysis indicates that Germany 
currently administers performance. So far BMZ works with limited commitment to, and 
application of multilateral performance, assessment and management principles. 
Managements of performances: Denmark and Netherlands 
The Netherlands is a strong supporter of the multilateral system. It is the biggest contribu-
tor to several UN agencies and has increased its contribution to IDA. It is also committed 
to increase its focus on European co-operation and is supportive of efforts towards a more 
unified aid policy among European Union Member States. The multilateral share of Dutch 
ODA was 28 % in 2005 but approximately four to five percentage points higher if bilateral 
funds channelled through multilateral agencies in the form of earmarked contributions are 
taken into account. 
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The Netherlands is a unitary, but decentralized state (Kickert / In't Veld 1997). The politi-
cal system is consociational, consensual, multiparty, and corporatist (Lijphart 1999). In the 
early 1990s, results-oriented budgeting and management regained attention. There was 
also an increased trend to integrate performance measures in the budget documents. Fi-
nally, in 2001, performance-budgeting (VBTB) was legally implemented: the format of 
the budget bill became outcome oriented and policy objectives and performance measures 
were integrated in the explanatory memorandum and the accruals-budgeting system has 
been planned to be extended from the agencies to the departments. 
The 2003 policy framework marks a shift in the Dutch multilateral policy towards an ap-
proach “more results driven and based on relevance to Dutch policy objectives” (OECD 
2006b). This has resulted in a shift from un-earmarked contributions towards theme-based 
earmarked contributions with the intention of meeting targets in Dutch priority areas. This 
approach poses some challenges, according to the 2006 DAC Peer Review. First, the re-
sulting fragmentation in Dutch funding of multilateral agencies can make it difficult for 
the MFA to have an overall consistent approach to multilateral assistance. Second, this à 
la carte practice could hinder multilateral agencies’ management improvement efforts and 
corporate focus, as individual agencies have to deal with competing demands from mem-
bers. 
In order to increase the overall consistency of its approach, the MFA has been working on 
a new strategy for managing its multilateral aid portfolio. The key proposal emerging from 
this work is to focus on about a dozen multilateral agencies and to co-ordinate Dutch con-
tributions to these agencies (at this point this approach has yet to be endorsed). The DAC 
Review recommends: in reviewing its overall multilateral approach, the Netherlands 
should make efforts to strike a balance between bilateral considerations and implications 
for multilateral agencies in order to avoid the risk of “bilateralising” multilateral agency 
programmes. it should also reinforce co-operation with other DAC members on collective 
approaches to improving the effectiveness of the multilateral aid system to ensure com-
plementarity among various multilateral assessment initiatives. Finally, given its objective 
of promoting greater multilateral effectiveness, the Netherlands is encouraged by the DAC 
Review to elaborate its multilateral strategy and to strike a balance between bilateral ob-
jectives and implications for the management of multilateral agencies, taking account of 
on-going reform efforts (cf. ibid.). 
The 2003 DAC Peer Review welcomed Denmark's efforts to form coalitions with other 
donors on issues concerning the performance of multilateral institutions, so as to better co-
ordinate the perspectives of all donors in this context. At the level of the field, the “active 
multilateralism” approach has been recommended being used creatively to promote im-
proved linkages between bilateral and multilateral agencies across all donors. The develop-
ment of the PMF is part of a larger internal reform of the management of Danish develop-
ment cooperation, which also includes far-reaching decentralisation of bilateral and multi-
lateral development cooperation. By January 2005, a restructuring of the multilateral co-
operation took place, when responsibility for the cooperation with a number of key multi-
lateral organisations was transferred to the four multilateral representations in New York, 
Washington, Geneva, and Rome. A series of tools and methodologies have been devel-
oped to measure, assess, monitor and improve performance and accountability. While the 
tools for multilateral development cooperation are expected to be further developed, those 
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used for bilateral cooperation will be further consolidated during the coming years 
(Danida 2005b). 
While multilateral performance management principles and practice (e.g. MOPAN, PMF, 
MMS, “New Approach”) is fairly well developed, they are inclined to be neither inte-
grated nor systemic yet. Even though, Danida is undertaking major steps in the direction 
of integrating its performances managements (Danida 2005b). 
Performance management: Canada and UK 
Canada's participation in multilateral programmes is part of its foreign policy agenda of 
economic prosperity, domestic security, and the projection of Canadian values. Canada 
works with multilateral institutions because it considers them to be the best way of ad-
dressing key development challenges and providing global public goods. The overall ob-
jectives with the multilateral institutions are to strengthen their ability to advance human 
development, particularly, in meeting the MDGs (OECD 2002, 30). 
Canada is a federal state with a ‘Westminster’ system. Antibureaucratic, pro-private-sector 
reforms, borrowed at least in part from the USA and the UK, have been introduced in the 
1980s. End of the 1990s however, a ‘Canadian model’ of public sector reform has been 
proclaimed. This included a rejection of the proposal that minimizing government was 
always a good thing and an embracing of experiment and diversity in organisational forms 
(Bourgon 1998; Savoie 1997). A perceived dissatisfaction with government, and alleged 
citizen demands for greater accountability, were seen as a major factor for public man-
agement reform in that time (Pollitt / Bouckaert 2004, 225). Bourgault and Carroll (1997, 
97) furthermore, refer to a quite strong ‘manadrin culture’, with considerable horizontal 
communication between senior civil servants in different departments. 
Major RBM-related reform packages include: in June 1995, a Quality Services Initiative 
approved by the Cabinet, aimed at increasing measured client satisfaction; in 1996, intro-
duction of the Improved Reporting to Parliament Project (IRPP) with the aim of enhancing 
accountability of ministers and departments to Parliament, in 1997, publication of Ac-
counting for Results (President of the Treasury Board 1997), which for the first time 
brought together results statements for all departments. The implementation process of 
public management reforms is in general seen as a somewhat uncertain one, at least in the 
sense that a number of reforms petered out after a relatively short period, leaving only 
traces rather than significant achievements that had been predicted at the time of their ini-
tiations. It is referred to a significant implementation gap (cf. Auditor General of Canada 
1993; cf. Pollitt 2005, 228). 
CIDA has been one of the pioneers in results-based management (RBM) and supports the 
current international effort, centred around the MDGs, to apply RBM across the whole aid 
system, multilateral as well as bilateral (OECD 2002). Already in 1995, CIDA reported 
that it had focussed its initial efforts on organizing and planning for renewal mainly at its 
headquarters. The Agency had developed a results-based management concept to 
strengthen its effectiveness. CIDA has introduced a Policy on Results-Based Management 
and is implementing it. The Agency has since developed a Framework of Results and Key 
Success Factors for measuring its results at the project level. It has also identified a set of 
Assessment Tools to enable the Framework to be used by operating personnel. These are 
the first of several steps required to build an effective performance measurement system. 
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They begin to respond to CIDA’s concern that it did not have satisfactory procedures to 
measure and report on its effectiveness (CIDA 1998; 2002; 2003). 
In his November Report 2006 the Auditor General of Canada has urged CIDA to move 
ahead with determination as it makes the changes necessary to renew itself. He stressed 
that challenges remain, namely: the need to do a better job of explaining how CIDA's proj-
ects contribute to government priorities; the need to establish clear accountabilities not 
only within CIDA but also with its partners; and the need for more transparency in its dea-
lings with stakeholders and the public. This was a follow-up of the 1993 audit, which had 
questioned the value achieved with CIDA's expenditures and had made recommendations 
to improve the Agency's accountability and management effectiveness. 
With about one-third of its ODA disbursed to multilateral organisations, the United King-
dom is an important contributor to that system. DFID has developed a strategic approach 
to the multilaterals, with individual institutional strategies framing the shape of each part-
nership. DFID tracks the results of the multilateral institutions through a Multilateral Ef-
fectiveness Framework (MEFF). These tools help DFID prioritise its multilateral support 
and provide the means to allow it to play a leading role within the international commu-
nity to promote the effectiveness of multilateral aid, in line with its 2005–08 PSA objec-
tive. The DAC commends the UK as being currently seen by many aid practitioners and 
donors as one of the bilateral models for today’s evolving world of development co-
operation (cf. OECD 2006d). 
The UK is a unitary and highly centralized state. In 1999 the Prime Minister issued a whi-
te Paper, Modernizing Government. Subsequently, the increases in public spending were 
accompanied by further intensification of central target-setting and performance meas-
urement (Hood 2002). As Blair famously said, his second term came to be about ‘delivery, 
delivery, delivery’ (cf. Pollitt 2005, 295). 
In line with a new approach across the UK Government, DFID set itself the task of basing 
policy on evidence, focusing on outcomes rather than inputs, and increasing the transpar-
ency of policy making and use of resources. The 1997 White Paper shifted the depart-
ment’s measurement of its performance towards the UK’s contribution to meeting the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, rather than on input-based measures of the UK’s contribu-
tion. An example of the effort to increase leverage was the Government’s willingness to 
channel resources through multilateral institutions where they are effective, such as 
through the World Bank. The UK gave a higher share of aid as multilateral assistance than 
the DAC average. Over 1996–2000 DFID provided on average 41 % of its aid through 
multilateral organizations compared with 36 % for all DAC donors (Barder 2005, 25 ff.). 
However, according to (Barder 2005, 26)and in common with other organizations, DFID 
did not satisfactorily resolve the tension, on the one hand wanting to increase the impor-
tance of measuring outcomes, and on the other hand needing evidence to attribute those 
outcomes to the UK’s own contribution. 
The 2006 DAC Peer Review (OECD 2006d) suggests that the UK should seek to improve 
strategic tools for the assessment of multilateral performance, such as the MEFF, and to 
further maximise their use internally and internationally. It is further recommended, while 
developing a strategic vision for funding of core and non-core multilateral budgets, DFID 
should take care not to distort multilateral principles. 
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For the performance management type, Canada and the UK come closest to the stringent 
requirements, although there are weaknesses in both cases that make the fit less than opti-
mal. 
4 Some conclusions and remaining challenges 
The making and harmonisation of multilateral performance assessments is now intensified 
by several donors. In most cases it is still work in progress at best. In other cases scepti-
cism prevails about a lack of evidence regarding their usefulness. Hence it is still not clear 
to what extent multilateral performance measures help bilateral agencies achieve the goals 
they have been set by their policy makers or as have been put forward by the international 
community in the MDGs and the Paris Declaration (Halachmi 2005; Propper / Wilson 
2003; Swiss 2005).  
Management initiatives from managing by objectives to results-based management often 
suffer from their own enthusiasm. Expectation gaps are quite common not only for multi-
lateral organisation performance assessment but also more broadly for any project of this 
type. Ammons / Coe / Lombardo (2001, 104 f.) amplify that even high-quality assessment 
systems delivering good results are disappointing when expectations are overblown and 
observers anticipate fabulous results. The battlefield of public management reforms is the-
refore said to be littered with casualties of excessive hype. 
Ammons’ et al. analysis of three different ‘performance-comparison projects’ of local gov-
ernment suggests differences in the gap of initial expectations and perceived results of par-
ticipants, depending on major objectives and practices20. For example, expectations were 
high for the identification of better performance measures for agencies’ services. These 
expectations were met fairly well. Moderate success was also recorded for providing unit-
cost comparisons, identifying top performers, fostering communication about processes 
and outcomes within and among participants, and providing information useful for com-
munication with (superior) executive or legislative bodies. Only one out of the three pro-
jects was able to provide useful information for operating or budgetary decisions. While 
none was awarded a critical score for providing information useful in communicating with 
the general public or for identifying and analysing best practice. 
Bevan / Hood (2004) point out that complete transparency in setting targets leads to prob-
lems in securing effective control; or in more relative terms: too much predictability in the 
name of transparency and accountability weakens control (Pollitt / Bouckaert 2004, 159–
181). Yet, it is argued that the obvious difficulties do not mean that targets and RBM 
should be scrapped. Targets have been introduced because alternative forms of control and 
accountability have been tried and found defective. As Winston Churchill said of democ-
racy, regulating performance through targets is the worst control system ever devised – 
except for all others (cf. ibid, 598). What is needed are ways of limiting gaming.21  
                                                 
20 See table 1: “taxonomy of multilateral performance assessments” or “factors affecting the choice of 
methodology” in OECD / World Bank (2007). 
21 See p. 4: the dilemmas of ‘creaming’, ‘teaching to the test’ or ‘setting low goals’ in RBM systems. 
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One way of doing so is to replace enthusiasm by practicality and to reduce complexity by 
identifying ‘minimum conditions’ (OECD / World Bank 2007, 3 ff.) for credible and qual-
ity multilateral organisation performance assessments ‘under real-world constraints’ 
(World Bank 2006b, 2 f.). In that respect the last 3 of the 5 MfDR principles (OECD 
2005b; 16) are especially relevant, e.g.: (i) keeping results measurement and reporting as 
simple, cost-effective, and user-friendly as possible; (ii) managing for, not by, results, by 
arranging resources to achieve outcomes, and (iii) using results information for learning 
and decision making as well as reporting and accountability.  
What else? Multilateral organisation performance assessment requires ‘scaling up’ of con-
ventional RBM approaches applied at project, country or agency levels (Duflo 2005; Fer-
roni / Mody 2002) and last but not least ‘opening the black box of aid effectiveness’ 
(Bourguignon / Sundberg 2007). Bourguignon and Sundberg reveal that analyses on aid 
effectiveness have yielded unclear and ambiguous results. This is not surprising given the 
heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations of the tools of analysis, and the complex cau-
sality chain linking external aid to final outcomes. The causality chain has been largely 
ignored and as a consequence the relationship between aid and development has been 
mostly handled as a kind of black box. Making further progress on aid effectiveness re-
quires opening that box and identifying ‘causal clusters’ (Young 2002) of aid, effective-
ness and results, i.e. the often conjured up attribution gap. Multilateral evidence on aid 
effectiveness is particularly fragile compared to other levels of assessment. Problems of 
coordination, (lack of) ownership, and attribution make not only financing of (Birdsall 
2004) but also accountability for multilateral policies costlier for donors to arrange, and 
riskier in terms of their sustainability and benefits.  
Dealing with both the ‘expectation gap’ and the ‘attribution gap’ remain major challenges 
for multilateral organisation performance assessments by donors. 
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Annex 1: Synthesis of international comparison 
 MOPAN COMPAS/ 
MfDR 
MEFF MERA PMF MMS „New  
Approach“ 
Responsible 
organization(s) 
Utstein plus (2003) Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks (2005) 
DFID/UK 
(2003) 
CIDA/Canada Danida/Denmark 
(2004) 
MFA/Netherlands Danida & OECD/ 
DAC (2004) 
Approach “Perception Analysis” “Self Assessment” & 
harmonization of 
practices 
 “Organizational effec-
tiveness of MO”) 
“Results & Manage-
ment Assessment” 
“Quality assessment of 
MO” 
“Perception analysis” “Peer Assessment” 
Objective Surveying partnership 
behaviours of MO 
with national govern-
ments, civil society 
and other bilateral and 
other relevant MO at 
the country level. 
(a) pool information 
about how MDBs are 
contributing to devel-
opment results (out-
puts and outcomes);  
(b) Monitor and syn-
thesize MDBs’ pro-
gress over time; and  
(c) contribute to les-
sons-learning, ac-
countability and trans-
parency. 
Provide information 
for agency’s: 
(a) Public Service 
Agreement reporting, 
(b) its Institutional 
Strategies, and  
(c) its financing strate-
gies 
Guiding CIDA staff in 
gathering information 
following a standard 
template of questions; 
 
Enabling responsible 
officers to make a 
final judgement on 
relevance and effec-
tiveness; 
(a) enhance quality of 
Danish development 
cooperation through 
focus on results,  
(b) improve manage-
ment and continous 
learning, through 
better information and 
reporting, and  
(c) strengthen account-
ability through per-
formance assessments 
and measurement in 
the context of increas-
ingly decentralized 
management structures 
Giving an insight into 
the general perception 
of a given MO 
(a) strengthen evalua-
tion capacity of MO 
and by that  
(b) enabling bilateral 
donors to depend on 
multilaterals’ own 
results reporting for 
performance assess-
ments 
Criteria Focus on quality of  
(a) national partner-
ship (e.g. contribution 
to policy-dialogue, 
advocacy); (b) inter-
agency partnership 
(e.g. information 
sharing, interagency 
coordination. 
3 components based 
on seven pillars: 
(a) developing country 
level  
(1=capacity building);  
(b) agency level 
(2=financing, 
3=strategies, 
4=projects/programs, 
5=M&E, 6=learning 
and incentives);  
(c) inter-agency level 
(7=working with other 
donors and investors 
on the MfDR agenda) 
Eight organizational 
systems and their 
focus on 
(a) internal perform-
ance,  
(b) country level re-
sults and  
(c) partnerships 
(a) relevance,  
(b) effectiveness and 
(c) improvement 
measures 
(a) corporate level 
(DANIDA);  
(b) organisation level 
(HQ);  
(c) country level(field 
level) 
Set of qualitative 
perception questions 
(a) credibility of MO’s 
evaluation process and 
reports;  
(b) independence of 
MO’s evaluation 
system,  
(c) use of evaluation 
evidence by MO; 
    
Methodology/ 
indicators 
(a) standard question-
naires,  
(b) agency templates, 
(c) country team 
discussions,  
(d) results of group 
discussions,  
(e) synthesis report  
 
Asking MO for ‘man-
agement responses’ to 
MOPAN reports to be 
posted also on the 
website 
Process and results 
indicators 
(a) Checklist,  
(b) scorecard format 
and a "traffic lights" 
scoring system, and  
(c) summary report 
 
Grouping of MO, 
combined on the basis 
of functionality; 
 
Process indicators 
MOs rated on a scale 
of 1 to 5 for each of 
the following 3 areas: 
relevance, results 
achieved and man-
agement. 
 
Weighing in the actual 
development results 
achieved, while prob-
lems of attribution are 
recognized. 
(a) organisation strate-
gies, annually measured 
through indicators of 
respective action plans;  
(b) at least biannually 
high-level consulta-
tions of MFA and MO; 
(c) perception analyses 
of general MO per-
formance;  
(d) joint donor assessment 
of MO (i.e. MOPAN); 
(e) perception analyses 
of MO at country level;  
(f) assessment of MOs 
M&E systems (i.e. 
“New Approach”) 
  
Link to ‘Paris 
Declaration’ 
(country level)  
Yes (predominant) Yes 
(plus country capacity 
building for MfDR) 
yes yes yes Yes (predominant) Yes 
Link to MDGs 
(international 
aid architec-
ture 
No (but on coherence 
with practice in the 
Rome and Paris Dec-
larations) 
Indirectly, as COM-
PAS report is used as 
input to the Global 
Monitoring Report by 
WB/IMF 
 yes yes   
Transaction 
Costs 
  Staff time/travel costs 
lower as compared to 
external evaluation 
    
Sustainability 
of exercise 
 Commitment by 
heads of MDBs; 
Internal training and 
dissemination required 
to compensate: 
(a) staff turnover,  
(b) insufficient resourcing 
of overhead costs, and  
(c) lack of MEFF-aware-
ness in other DFID parts. 
    
Limitations or 
critique 
  (a) doubts of MOs about 
generic applicability;  
(b) concerns of MOs 
about proliferation of 
similar initiatives 
Suffers from a lack of 
detail. It is considered 
to be an interim sys-
tem requiring elabora-
tion and specificity 
   
Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment 
German Development Institute 33
Annex 2: The MOPAN 
1. RATIONALE 
Public opinion and government decision-makers are paying increasing attention to the 
effectiveness of the multilateral organisations (MOs) to whom they provide resources. The 
need for better information about MO behaviour in developing countries has become ever 
more compelling. On the other hand, the resources that each donor can devote to gathering 
relevant knowledge of multilateral performance are limited. 
Working together allows MOPAN members to meet this challenge. Drawing on the col-
lective knowledge and experience of their country-level staff, as well as encouraging the 
latter’s involvement in and ownership of the exercise helps MOPAN avoid duplication of 
work on all sides. Pooling of resources keeps transaction costs at a minimum and makes 
the assessments cost-effective for the participating MOPAN members. 
2. APPROACH 
MOPAN carries out regular joint assessments of the work of MOs in a number of coun-
tries where members have their own bilateral programmes. As a rolling exercise, most of 
the major MOs at the country-level will, over time, be covered. Maintaining a standard 
methodology makes it possible to compare results over time and identify trends. 
The assessment is an opinion survey. It draws upon the perceptions of MOPAN member 
staff about the in-country performance of MOs, relative to their respective mandates. Par-
ticipants are asked to give their views on those behavioural aspects of MOs’ performance 
where they are likely to be knowledgeable thanks to their direct inter-agency contacts. 
The assessment focuses on the quality of the partnership behaviour of the MO’s: 
Their national partnerships (contribution to policy dialogue, capacity development, advo-
cacy, support to civil society, and alignment to national institutions, policies and admini-
stration) 
Their inter-agency partnerships (information sharing, inter-agency coordination, harmoni-
sation and general local responsiveness) 
3. PROCESS AND INSTRUMENTS 
The institutional questionnaire 
The institutional questionnaire is designed to help each MOPAN member embassy/  
country office participating in the assessment to assemble its views about MO perform-
ance on a range of partnership issues. It is completed by each embassy/country office prior 
to the group discussions within the MOPAN country team and provides an input to the 
compilation of the country report. 
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The templates on the MOs 
To assist the country teams, the MOPAN headquarters group prepares for them a back-
ground information brief on the key aspects of each MO (e.g. mandate, structure, and or-
ganisation). 
The hotline 
A hotline is at the disposal of the country teams for advice and support during the actual 
assessment period. The hotline responds rapidly to their queries about the objectives, the 
approach, the process as well as the use of the Survey’s findings. 
The country team discussion 
The MOPAN country team meets as the focus group, where individual knowledge and 
perceptions are pooled and a collective view of the MOs’ respective performance emerges. 
This exercise serves also to encourage the staff’s ownership of the exercise. 
The country reports 
The outcome of the group discussions is condensed into the MOPAN country report. It 
reflects the collective point of view arrived at by the group on each MO. The country re-
port also contains information about the team’s process in reaching its consensus. 
The Synthesis Report 
The Synthesis Report provides a synthesis of the country reports, based largely on a tex-
tual analysis of the reports. The aggregate questionnaire results are also used as an input. 
The Survey has been implemented at field level during February to April and the Synthe-
sis Report been compiled during May and June. The report has been adopted by the  
MOPAN HQ team in October and discussions with the MOs have taken place by the end 
of 2006. 
4. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ASSESSED MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS 
Dialogue with the MOs at their headquarters 
The Synthesis Report is presented to the MOs concerned at their headquarters. This is an 
opportunity for a substantive dialogue between the MOPAN headquarters group and the 
MOs and for mutual learning among partners. 
Discussions with the MOs at the country-level 
At the country-level, the MOPAN country team shares the country report with the respec-
tive MO country offices. A follow-up meeting is held once the Synthesis Report has been 
issued. Sharing the country report and the Synthesis Report provides an opportunity to 
increase mutual knowledge and understanding among partners. 
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5. COMMUNICATIONS 
The final version of the annual Synthesis Report is posted on the external websites of each 
of the participating MOPAN members, together with any comments on the report pro-
vided by the assessed MOs. A Frequently Asked Questions and a one page fact sheet are 
also posted on their websites. 
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Annex 3: Example of MOPAN: UNICEF 
 
 
 
Box 1: UNICEF’s partnership performance at a glance: summary of findings 
UNICEF’s partnership performance at a glance: summary of findings 
According to the MOPAN country reports, the overall perception of UNICEF at the country level 
is that of a very knowledgeable, committed and influential multilateral organisation in the spe-
cific areas of its mandate. UNICEF is perceived to be a strong voice for children and women, to 
pursue its clear priorities, and to be determined to show results and deliver on its promises - in-
cluding in very difficult circumstances. This is balanced with a view that at times UNICEF is not 
fully sensitive to the local or to the broader development context. MOPAN country teams per-
ceive that getting the job done quickly sometimes seems more important to UNICEF than invest-
ing in partnerships, especially with civil society and other development agencies. 
Summary of how MOPAN country teams perceive the quality of UNICEF’s partnership be-
haviour towards national stakeholders: 
a. positive contribution to policy dialogue, but room for further improvement (page 7); 
b. mixed performance in terms of capacity development of various national stake-
 holders; more engaged with public institutions where contribution to capacity devel-
 opment is moderately effective; good quality technical expertise – although not al-
 ways appropriate for local needs (page 8); 
c. a strong comparative advantage in advocacy (page 10); 
d.  various experiences of involving NGOs in policy dialogue; very little such experience 
 with the private sector (page 12); and 
e. support to national poverty reduction strategies; progress in aligning its own work; 
 weak alignment with government modalities and procedures with the exception of 
 sector-wide approach arrangements (page 12). 
Summary of how MOPAN country teams perceive the quality of UNICEF’s partnership be-
haviour towards other development agencies: 
f. rather modest performance in terms of sharing information (page 14); 
g. active and regular participation in local donor coordination groups; mixed picture re-
garding coordination at the project/programme level; good examples of UN coordi-
nated responses to crisis situations (page 15); 
h. slow adapter to local aid harmonisation efforts (page 17); and 
i. improved responsiveness to local concerns, particularly as a result of increased decen-
tralisation of decision-making authority to country offices and positive contributions 
of heads of UNICEF country offices (page 18). 
Source: (MOPAN 2006, 4) 
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Annex 4: Managing for Development Results (MfDR) Principles 
Box 2: Examples of MfDR in development agencies 
MfDR Principles Examples of tools being used to manage 
for results in development agencies 
Why these are important 
Focus the dia-
logue on results at 
all phases of the 
development 
process 
Agency policy/priority frameworks 
Country programming strategies 
Thematic/sector strategies 
Project results frameworks 
Stakeholder/partner planning and consul-
tation mechanisms 
Logic models or results chains (integrated 
in all of the above) 
Results-based tools and processes are 
used to plan for and implement interme-
diate results linked to country outcomes. 
Different tools are adapted depending on 
the level at which they are used, but they 
all show how policy, country program, 
thematic and project results contribute to 
country, regional, or global outcomes, 
including supporting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). 
Align program-
ming, monitoring 
and evaluation 
with results 
Agencywide multiyear strategic plans or 
rolling work plans  
Annual program/project management 
plans, work plans and budgets 
Training and guidelines for pro-
ject/program planning and results man-
agement 
Performance management plans 
Results-based tools are used to demon-
strate how agency investments and inputs 
will contribute to country, regional, or 
global outcomes, as well as to indicate 
how different agency management proc-
esses can support the achievement of 
results. 
Keep results mea-
surement and 
reporting as sim-
ple, costeffective, 
and user-friendly 
as possible 
M&E systems, plans and guidelines (in-
corporating MIS) 
Audit and risk management frameworks 
Performance measurement frameworks 
Program/project monitoring frameworks 
Audit guidelines and tools  
Evaluation guidelines and tools  
Risk analysis guidelines and tools  
Training and guidelines for indicator 
design, data collection, and analysis 
Tools and guides describe the steps and 
processes to be used in collecting and 
analyzing performance data at different 
levels within development agencies, and 
form the basis for continuing skill build-
ing with agency managers and staff. 
Manage for, not 
by, results, by 
arranging re-
sources to achieve 
outcomes 
Performance reviews and evaluations 
Internal/external performance monitoring 
processes and reviews 
Performance and management audits 
Thematic and sector studies 
Performance information from monitoring 
and evaluation is used as the basis for 
assessing progress toward identified 
country, regional, or global outcomes at 
various levels. 
Use results infor-
mation for learn-
ing and decision 
making as well as 
reporting and 
accountability 
Annual agency performance reports to 
advisory boards/committees, elected offi-
cials and their citizens 
Annual country program performance 
reports to agency decision makers/ 
committees, elected officials, and country 
citizens 
Training and guidelines for management 
decision making based on results informa-
tion 
Analysis of evaluations and reallocation 
of resources to better achieve results 
Reports within and among agencies, and 
between agencies and their main stake-
holders, provide the basis for ongoing 
agency strategic review, performance 
adjustment, and reallocation of resources. 
Source: OECD / World Bank (2006, 134) 
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Annex 5: The Common Performance Assessment System (COMPAS)22 
In response to international commitments on performance and accountability, a Common 
Performance Assessment System (COMPAS) was proposed by the Multilateral Develop-
ment Bank (MDB) Working Group on ‘Managing for Development Results’ (MfDR). The 
coalition of MDBs involved in this initiative include: the African Development Bank, Asi-
an Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank. 
COMPAS’ objectives are to: 
o Pool information about how MDBs are contributing to development results  
(outputs and outcomes); 
o Monitor and synthesize MDBs’ progress over time; and 
o Contribute to lessons-learning, accountability and transparency. 
COMPAS findings have been published in an annual report, in 2006. It is intended to pro-
duce an annual report every year. This report will act as an inter-agency communication 
product, as it will systematically record MDBs’ respective MfDR policies and practices, 
and relevant modifications over time. More importantly, however, it will seek to identify 
common definitions and results-based methodologies between these organizations that can 
be integrated into a common framework. COMPAS’ goal is to facilitate comparability of 
data between MDBs (e.g. regarding program outputs and outcomes), and ultimately, to 
contribute to harmonization of practices between institutions. 
Annual updates on MDB’s respective progress and lessons learned, and according revi-
sions to the common approach, will allow monitoring of progress. Transparency will be 
ensured by making the report accessible to all external stakeholders and the public. 
The conceptual framework for COMPAS draws on MDBs’ existing performance systems, 
and includes three basic components: 
i) Building MfDR capacity in developing countries by focusing on needs assessment 
knowledge sharing and capacity building; 
ii) Improving the results focus of their internal systems and instruments in areas of fi-
nance, country/sector and regional strategies, projects and programmes, monitoring 
and evaluation, and learning and incentives; and  
iii) Working with other development agencies (donors and investors) on the MfDR 
agenda. 
COMPAS intends to put forward process and results indicators for subcategories of the 
above mentioned basic pillars, selecting them on the basis of relevance to results, cover-
age, comparability and availability of data. The following master matrix of categories and 
indicators is presented in COMPAS 2005 proposal. The aforementioned three components 
are based on a total of seven pillars: 
 
 
                                                 
22 Source: CIDA (2006b). 
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Table 5: Components and pillars of COMPAS 
PERFORMANCE 
CATEGORY 
SUB-CATEGORIES TO BE 
MONITORED 
PROCESS INDICATORS RESULTS INDICATORS 
 
Pillar I: Developing country level 
1a. Public and private 
sector capacity  
building needs  
assessment 
- CB needs assessment tools 
available 
 
- % of countries with needs 
assessments completed 
- % country strategies with 
analysis of country capacity 
for MfDR 
1b MfDR sensitization 
and knowledge  
sharing 
- MfDR knowledge sharing 
mechanisms established (work-
shops, networks, virtual links 
etc) 
- % target audience in devel-
oping countries covered 
1. Capacity 
building (CB) 
1c MfDR capacity build-
ing programmes 
- CB programmes launched 
where relevant 
- % of target countries with 
CB programs underway or 
completed 
Pillar II: Agency level 
2. Financing  2a Performance based 
resource allocation for 
low-income countries 
- country performance indicators 
in place for eligible countries 
- % concessional resources 
allocated to countries with 
high scores according to 
each MDB’s PBA formula 
3. Strategies 
(country, sec-
tor, regional) 
3a Outcome focus, eva-
luability 
- Revised guidelines issued to 
enhance results focus of strate-
gies 
- Mechanisms in place for  
reviewing the results  
focus of strategies 
- % of borrowers with MDB 
strategies based on revised 
guidelines 
- % of country strategies 
whose evaluability is inde-
pendently reviewed  
4a Outcome focus, eva-
luability 
- Project results frameworks 
reviewed and improved where 
necessary (revised guidelines 
etc) 
- % with satisfactory results 
frameworks as defined by 
each MDB 
- % with satisfactory baseline 
data 
- % of projects whose evalu-
ability is independently re-
viewed 
4b Project and pro-
gramme delivery 
(speed of disburse-
ment and implementa-
tion) 
- Simplification of disbursement 
procedures 
- Simplification of operational 
procedures 
- Actual annual disbursement 
as % amounts available for 
disbursement at beginning 
of the year 
- Ratio of originally planned 
over active implementation 
period length  
4. Projects and 
programmes 
4c Quality of design and 
supervision  
- Increased arms length scrutiny 
of project quality at entry 
- Quality of supervision reviews 
in place or under development 
- QAE % satisfactory or 
better 
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4d Management of proj-
ect risk 
 
- Early warning system in place 
- Proactive management of proj-
ects at risk 
- % projects at risk, on alert 
status or similar 
- % projects at risk being 
actively managed (proactiv-
ity index)  
5a Monitoring instru-
ments, procedures, 
practices 
- Active project monitoring 
system in place (self-assessed)  
yielding appropriate levels of 
information 
- Monitoring/supervision 
compliance rates 
 
5b Quality assurance 
systems 
- Arms length review of self-
assessed reporting in place or 
being developed 
- Arms length review reports  
5c Independent evalua-
tion 
 
- Ex-post evaluation of country 
programmes 
- Ex-post evaluations of projects 
and programmes 
 
- % active borrowers that 
have a country programme 
evaluation 
- % projects and programmes 
with satisfactory outcomes 
5. Monitoring 
and evalua-
tion 
5d Results reporting 
system 
- Adequate resourcing of M&E 
activities  
- Regular and extensive reporting 
of M&E data  
 
- % admin. budget allocated to 
internal M&E (quality assur-
ance, evaluation and audit) 
- other indicator to be identi-
fied 
6a Capturing and using 
good practice  
- Good practice materials col-
lected, field tested and avail-
able on-line 
- Management uptake of 
evaluation recommenda-
tions as reported to Exec. 
Boards 
6b Staff training and 
guidance 
- MfDR training packages devel-
oped and field tested 
- On-the-job help lines estab-
lished 
- % operational staff partici-
pating in MfDR training  
- other indicator to be identi-
fied 
6. Learning and 
incentives 
6c Staff incentives - Formal and transparent use of 
MfDR dimensions in annual 
personal performance reviews  
- % operational staff covered 
by results- focused incentive 
system 
Pillar III: Inter-Agency level  
7a Information sharing - Participation in MDB MfDR 
working group  
- DAC JV on MfDR 
- MfDR Sourcebook on line 
and updated regularly 
7b Harmonisation - Areas for MfDR harmonisation 
identified by working group 
- Number of MfDR products 
and processes for which 
common principles are 
agreed (to be defined) 
7. Working with 
other donors 
and investors 
on the MfDR 
agenda 
7c Cooperative/joint 
ventures 
- Procedures developed for joint 
country, sectoral and regional 
programming 
- COMPAS developed 
- Number of joint MfDR 
activities/programmes 
- COMPAS reporting annu-
ally 
Source: CIDA (2006b, 29–30) 
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Annex 6: The MEFF Checklist and major findings 
Since its inception, MEFF has yielded several general results. It found that most interna-
tional organizations use RBM, and their approaches are increasingly converging due to 
improved inter-agency communication and coordination efforts. MEFF has identified 
three forms of organizational change: consolidating reforms, ‘big bang’ reforms and in-
cremental reforms. Mature agencies that have long had RBM frameworks are those that 
are consolidating reforms (e.g. World Bank). Formerly weak agencies that adopted RBM 
systems as part of major structural change are instituting ‘big bang’ reforms (e.g. UNDP, 
UNFPA, UNIDO, African Development Bank, etc) . Meanwhile, other agencies that have 
been slower and more prudent in their adoption of RBM, are making only piecemeal, in-
cremental reforms (e.g. WHO, IFAD, Asian Development Bank). 
MEFF found that organizations assessed had strongest results in areas of corporate strat-
egy and human resource management. They also scored high in internal performance, re-
flecting long-standing concerns with internal efficiency, delivery and quality assurance; 
Table 6: The MEFF checklist and major findings 
Organizational 
systems 
Internal 
Performance 
Focus on 
country 
Level results
Focus on  
partnership 
Corporate 
Governance 
3 questions 3 questions 3 questions 
Corporate 
Strategy 
3 questions 3 questions 3 questions 
Resource 
Management 
4 questions 3 questions 2 questions 
Operational 
Management 
4 questions 2 questions 3 questions 
Quality 
Assurance 
4 questions 3 questions  2 questions 
Staff 
Management 
4 questions 2 questions 3 questions 
M&E Lesson 
learning 
3 questions 3 questions 3 questions 
Reporting 3 questions 3 questions 3 questions 
 
Source: DFID (2005) 
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and in inter-agency partnerships, indicating an improvement in inter-agency coordination 
systems. Conversely, most organizations scored lowest in monitoring and evaluation, fo-
cusing more on inputs and activities, than outcomes; and in country level results, due to an 
inability to bring country programmes in line with national poverty reduction strategies. 
MEFF’s inter-agency comparison revealed that there are great variations in organizational 
effectiveness among different groups of multilaterals, most notably among standard-
setting agencies. Humanitarian and coordinating agencies scored best overall, and MDBs 
demonstrated great consistency. 
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Annex 7: Example of MEFF: UNIDO 
 
 
 
Box 3: Example of MEFF: UNIDO 
DFID communicated the MEFF outcome to UNIDO on 2 March 2005; permission for public disclosure 
was received on 31 March 2005. It includes an overview of the results of 23 multilateral institution as-
sessments, information on the MEFF methodology, and a detailed assessment of UNIDO. 
Within the UN standard setting agencies, UNIDO was rated the best: 
• UNIDO achieved a total score of 86, while the average score was 62 (the other organizations 
scored 51 to 68 points);  
• On internal performance, UNIDO scored 88 points, while the average was 66 (the other organi-
zations scored from 52 to 68 points);  
• On the country level results focus, UNIDO scored 75 points, while the average was 51 (the o-
ther organizations scored from 28 to 65 points);  
• On partnerships, UNIDO scored 95 points, while the average was 67 (the other organizations 
scored from 54 to 70 points). 
Within the 23 multilateral institutions, UNIDO was rated: 
• Sixth on total scores; 
• Fourth on internal performance; 
• Eleventh on the country-level results; 
• Second on partnerships. 
Out of the 72 indicators used by DFID to assess internal performance, country level results and partner-
ship, 70 indicators were applicable to UNIDO. The following provides a summary of DFID assessment 
ratings of UNIDO: 
 
Rating Description Number  
achieved 
Percentage 
Green All the assessments are positive 51 73 
Amber There are concerns about some issues, but improve-
ments being put in place – Watching brief  
18 26 
Red The assessments are negative, and no plans for im-
provement yet  
  1   1 
Blue No information   0 - 
White Not relevant   2 - 
 
Source: UNIDO (2005) 
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Annex 8: The Multilateral Effectiveness and Relevance Assessment (MERA) 
Table 7: Interim MO relevance and effectiveness assessment (MERA) of CIDA 
Source of 
informa-
tion 
Relevance Effectiveness Improvement measures (by 
the institution and by MPB) 
Links to MDGs: 
 General link between 
MO’s mandate and 
MDGs; 
 Specific MDGs targeted 
by MO  
Overall governance 
 General overview of 
MO; 
 Donor or recipient 
driven; 
 Resident board or ex-
ecutive council 
 Independent evaluators’ 
impression of govern-
ance; 
 General reputation; 
 Personal insights of 
evaluator 
 Donor or recipient 
driven specific im-
provements (e.g. insti-
tuting a report, imple-
menting a new policy, 
providing consulting to 
improve RBM) 
 General improvements 
(e.g. ensuring strong 
Canadian voice on 
board on issues with re-
spect to operating 
budget harmonization)  
Role in the Multilateral ar-
chitecture: 
 How MO fits in multi 
development system 
Region/ sector specific, 
UN or IFI or other 
 Kind of aid loans, grants 
 Budget support 
 Tech assistance 
 Partnership with another 
MDI 
 role within the MDI sys-
tem in a particular area 
Efficient use of resources 
 Operating costs as a per-
cent of its aid delivery  
 Strengths and weak-
nesses, factors which 
hinder efficiency  
 
Support to IPS sectors: 
 Sectoral breakdown of 
its most recent year of 
programming 
Donor harmonization and 
alignment – Paris Declaration
 Work towards objectives 
of the Paris declaration 
 Harmonizing/aligning 
with other UN organisa-
tions or IFIs and bilaterals
 
 Managing for results 
 Extent of RBM systems 
 Reporting systems 
 
 Quality of reporting, moni-
toring & evaluation systems 
 
 Gender mainstreaming: 
 Policy 
 Implementation 
 
E.g. 
2000-2003 
- MOPAN 
 
2004 
- DANIDA 
- CIDA 
Field Staff 
Survey 
 
2005 
- DFID 
MEFF 
(Score: 88) 
- Global 
Funds 
Evaluation 
- CIDA 
Field Staff 
Survey 
 Environment mainstreaming:
 Policy 
 Implementation 
 
Overall assessment: 
Description of how relevant and effective the institution is both in its own right and compared with other 
MDIs and donors comes in.   
Source: CIDA (2006c) 
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Purpose of Multilateral Effectiveness Review 
(i) To better inform policy and financial allocation decisions on more solid evi-
dence. Ultimately, we aim at getting more predictable multi-year funding, and 
an adequate balance between core and responsive/earmarked funding. 
(ii) To better exercise our accountability and improve our reporting to Canadian 
citizens. 
(iii) For more effective Board meetings and better identification of areas requiring 
improvements. 
(iv) To deliver on MPB commitment to complete the multilateral effectiveness re-
view, as part of the Agency Aid Effectiveness agenda. 
As stated in the 2006–07 Report on Plans and Priorities for CIDA: 
“The Government of Canada is committed to taking a more strategic approach in its sup-
port to multilateral organizations, including promoting reforms for aid effectiveness and 
transparency, ensuring resources are allocated where they can have the greatest impact, 
encouraging greater participation by international financial institutions in debt relief, and 
focusing greater support on those institutions that are most effective in promoting govern-
ance (including freedom and democracy, human rights, rule of law, justice, and account-
able public institutions) and contributing to the MDGs. 
The following provides a grid for comparing MOs receiving core funding within each Di-
rectorate. Assessments will be based on the submissions made by Program Managers of 
the Multilateral Effectiveness and Relevance Assessments (MERAs), supplemented by 
additional information, such as the institutions reports, the field surveys, any reports indi-
cating results achieved. The next step will be to review the current level of funding to 
these institutions and propose a new allocation, as required. 
The proposed grid is consistent and coherent with the new Agency Logic Model 
Methodology 
Organizations will be rated on a scale of 1 to 5 for each of the following 3 areas: rele-
vance, results achieved and management. 
1 2 3 4 5 
disastrous poor average very good outstanding 
Limitations: 
BMG decided to weight in the actual development results achieved, although, as noted by 
DFID in their MEFF Methodology: “There is very little information available on results; 
there are problems in attributing results to the actions of a single aid agency; it is difficult 
to compare different types of results (e.g. inoculations, enrolments, policy advice, capacity 
building)”. 
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EXPLANATION OF CRITERIA 
RELEVANCE 
1. MDGs: 
a) To what extent does the MO’s mandate, corporate strategy and programming support 
the MDGs? 
b) Has the MO integrated MDG-like targets and indicators in planning processes, both 
globally and on a country/regional basis? 
2. Other Canadian international development policies: 
a) To what extent does the MO support other Canadian international development policies 
in general? 
b) Does the MO have a policy on mainstreaming Environment? 
c) Does the MO have a policy on mainstreaming Gender Equality? 
3. Multilateral architecture: 
a) How relevant and strategic is the MO within the multilateral development system? 
b) Does the organization play an important international role in setting norms and prac-
tices? Does it play a pro-active and leadership role on select sector/thematic issues? 
c) Does the mandate of the organization respond to legally binding obligations? 
d) Does the mandate of the organization overlap with others, or is it unique, such as  
humanitarian assistance, and has it established a clear division of labour with peer  
multilateral development institutions? 
e) Does the organization have adequate formal and informal collaborative arrangements/ 
partnerships/linkages with like-minded organizations to support performance and bring 
new ideas and resources to the organization? 
RESULTS 
These correspond to the immediate outcomes level in CIDA’s logic model. 
1. Institution’s own performance rating: how does the MO rate itself on results? 
2. Is the MO achieving expected and sustainable results on the ground, including  
 capacity building, or timely and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance? 
3. Advocacy role: what evidence is there of partner countries which have modified  
 their policy frameworks as a direct result of advocacy and influence by the MO  
 (e.g. integration of MDGs in poverty reduction strategies)? 
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4. Setting norms: “has the MO established or increased partnerships which support 
 knowledge-sharing and policy influence to set or raise standards of development, for 
 example for the treatment of disease or the definition of sound governance?” 
MANAGEMENT OF THE INSTITUTION (Efficiency & Effectiveness) 
These correspond to the Immediate Outcomes in CIDA’s logic model 
1. Efficiency: 
a) What has been the trend in overhead costs? Have there been recent exercises to in-
crease the cost-effectiveness of administration, such as operational budget reviews? 
b) Is the organization’s financial and budgetary management effective, accountable and 
transparent? 
c) Are funding sources secure, stable and diversified? 
2. Effectiveness – Governance: 
a) Is there a broadly-based governing board, particularly in terms of representation from 
developing countries? 
b) Is there a clear accountability framework upon which management/staff performance 
is assessed? 
c) Is there an independent oversight function? 
3. Effectiveness – Harmonization: 
a) To what extent does the MO support Program Based Approaches, defined as a way of 
engaging in development cooperation based on principles of co-ordinated support for 
a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, 
a sector programme, a thematic programme. Programme based approaches share the 
following features: 
(i) leadership by a host country or organisation; 
(ii) a single comprehensive programme and budget framework; 
(iii) a formalised process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor 
procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procure-
ment; 
(iv) efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and im-
plementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. 
Other macro indicators as defined by the Paris Declaration include: 
(b) A high proportion of the MO’s aid flows are reported on partners’ national budgets; 
(c) A high proportion of capacity development support from the MO provided through 
co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners’ national development strategies; 
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(d) A high proportion of aid flows from the MO use procurement and/or public financial 
management systems in partner countries; 
(e) A minimal usage of parallel project implementation units; 
(f) A high predictability of aid disbursements from the MO released according to agreed 
schedules in annual or multi-year frameworks;(g) A high percentage of field missions 
and country analytical work that are carried out jointly with other donors. 
4. Effectiveness – Performance-based allocation: 
a) Does the organization use performance-based allocation of resources? 
5. Effectiveness – Capacity to manage for development results: 
a) To what extent has the MO taken the results-based management agenda on board?  
Does the MO have a performance framework based on results and a risk management 
strategy? 
b) Does the MO have a policy on development effectiveness and does it have a develop-
ment effectiveness committee? 
c) Does the MO report regularly on corporate performance and are these reports out-
comes-focused? 
d) Does the MO report on effectiveness at country levels 
e) Do reports link plans, resource allocations, outputs, outcomes and impacts? 
f) Does Management act on performance results?  Are there adequate mechanisms for 
lesson learning? 
g) Does the MO have an independent evaluation function, i.e. the evaluation function re-
ports to the Board not to Management? How well does the evaluation office function? 
h) Does the institution have a formal and open policy dialogue process with civil society 
organizations, the private sector and local governments? 
i) Is there an increasing demand from stakeholders on the institution for policy or techni-
cal advice? 
j) Is gender equality being implemented?  Does the organization have gender-related 
monitoring capacity? Does the MO disaggregate data by gender?  What is the MO’s 
overall reputation in this area? 
k) Is environmental sustainability being implemented as a cross cutting theme? Does the 
organization have environment-related monitoring capacity? What is the MO’s overall 
reputation in this area? 
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Annex 9: The Danish PMF 
The PFM includes a series of tools that combine qualitative and quantitative information 
for multilateral and bilateral development cooperation. Key tools for its quality assessment 
of multilateral organizations include: 
Organisation strategies govern the Danish cooperation with the multilateral organisations 
receiving more than DKK 20 million annually as well as organisations that are strategi-
cally important to Danish multilateral cooperation. These strategies outline the overall 
Danish priorities vis-à-vis the organisation and progress in meeting these objectives is 
measured annually through action plans which contain indicators of performance in four 
pre-determined areas. 
High-level Consultations between the MFA and each of the multilateral organisations take 
place at least biannually to assess the organisation’s progress towards implementing the 
Danish strategy for the organisation and issues relating to the organisation’s handling of 
Table 8: Overview of PMF for multilateral development cooperation 
 Focus of PMS Key Management 
Documents 
Methodology and 
Source of Information 
Reporting and 
Key Responsible 
Corporate 
Level  
(Danida) 
Measure perfor-
mance and verify 
results on overall 
goals, objectives  
and indicators in key 
policy documents 
Partnership 2000 
MDGs  
Various sector or 
issue-specific 
policies and strate-
gies   
Annual report on action 
plans 
Assessment of Multi-
lateral Organisations  
(HQ & Field)   
Evaluations 
MOPAN  
Annual  
Performance Report 
(KVA) 
Annual report of 
Danida (UDV)   
Organisation 
level 
(HQ) 
Monitor perform-
ance against the 
objectives, targets 
and indicators set 
out in Organisations’ 
own vision and 
strategy 
Monitor perform-
ance against the 
objectives, targets 
and indicators set 
out in Organisation 
Strategies 
Organisation Stra-
tegies & action 
plans 
 
Multilateral and rele-
vant departments’ 
Assessment of Multi-
lateral Organisations 
Minutes from High 
Level Consultations 
(Dep.) & Annual report 
on action plans 
Assessments of RBM   
Evaluations   
Annual Perfor-
mance Report 
(KVA) 
Report to the Board 
of Danida (Dep.) 
Annual Perfor-
mance Report 
(KVA) 
Assessment Reports 
(KVA) 
Evaluation reports 
(EVAL)  
Country 
Level 
(field level) 
Monitor performance 
at country level a-
gainst the objectives, 
targets and indica-
tors set out in Or-
ganisations’ own 
vision and strategy 
Organisation Stra-
tegies & action 
plans 
Bilateral  
Representations’s  
Assessment of Multi-
lateral Organisations 
MOPAN 
Annual Perfor-
mance Report 
(KVA) 
Assessment reports 
(KVA) 
Source: DANIDA (2005b, 17)  
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all general and earmarked contributions provided by Denmark. The minutes of these meet-
ings constitute important monitoring information. 
Perception analyses of the general performance of multilateral organisations are made by 
multilateral representations and relevant departments in MFA. 
Joint donor assessments of multilateral organisations’ effort at country level (MOPAN) 
are carried out annually in a joint effort between Denmark and like-minded donors. 
Perception analyses of the performance of multilateral organisations at country level are 
carried out by Embassies in programme countries. 
Evaluations/assessments of multilateral organisations’ performance reporting systems are 
carried out jointly with other donors to provide the basis for support to strengthening the 
capacity of the organisations to provide high-quality performance information themselves. 
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Annex 10: The Dutch MMS 
The MMS is a report constructed out of the opinions of embassy staff and their peers. It 
gives an insight into the general perceptions of a given multilateral that the Dutch gov-
ernment funds. Specifically, embassy staff and peers are asked to comment on the follow-
ing: 
— Degree of embassy involvement or co-operation with in-country multilaterals (either 
through financing modalities, or intense dialogue); 
— Perceived extent to which given multilaterals’ mandates and activities are contributing 
to poverty reduction; 
— Whether multilaterals’ respective mandates relevant to AEV23 goals; 
— Whether multilaterals’ respective mandates relevant to AEV (i.e. education, environ-
ment / water, repro health, and HIV/AIDS); 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ contributions to the im-
provement of the business climate (i.e. in relation to AEV factors: efforts to 
strengthen the financial sector, fight corruption, train customs and tax officials; 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ to the improvement of 
Good Governance (i.e. improvement of dialogue on human rights, democratic princi-
ples, the fight against corruption, the business climate, management of natural re-
sources, illegal migration, and human trafficking, legislative and judicial improve-
ments to government structures); 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ to the improvement of lo-
cal governmental responsibilities (ownership), and are the organizations programs a-
ligned with those of the government; 
— The total amount of financial aid spend by this organization in the country; 
— Size of the embassy’s portfolio with respective organizations (e.g. finances, projects); 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ contributions to the AEV 
goals; 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ accountability and finan-
cial management; 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ foci on their own mandate; 
— How satisfactory are respective multilateral organizations’ co-operation with other 
donors. 
 
                                                 
23 AEV is the Dutch development report on co-operation: ‘Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities’. 
Andreas Obser 
  German Development Institute 52 
Annex 11: The “New Approach” 
 
The New Approach is based on assessment by a panel of professional evaluators. It stipu-
lates that this “peer panel” should comprise representatives from both bilateral and multi-
lateral agencies, and beneficiary countries as well as independent evaluation expertise. 
This is thus a peer review by professionals, and not a peer review between organisations 
(Danida 2006a, 2). 
Table 9: The “New Approach” 
Principle Statement 
Evaluation Purpose — To improve future aid policy, programs and projects through feedback of 
lessons; and to provide a basis for accountability including the provision of 
information to the public. 
Impartiality and 
Independence 
— The evaluation process should be impartial and independent in its function 
from the process concerned with the policy making, the delivery, and the 
management of development assistance. 
Credibility — The credibility of evaluation depends on the expertise and independence of 
the evaluators and the degree of transparency of the evaluation process. 
Credibility requires that evaluations should report success as well as fail-
ures. Recipient countries should, as a rule, fully participate in evaluation in 
order to promote credibility and commitment 
Usefulness — To have an impact on decision-making, evaluation findings must be per-
ceived as relevant and useful and be presented in a clear and concise way. 
They should fully reflect the different interests and needs many parties in-
volved in development cooperation 
Participation by 
donors and recipi-
ents 
— Consistent with the partnership Principle stressed above, whenever possi-
ble, both donors and recipients should be involved in the evaluation proc-
ess. 
Donor Cooperation — Collaboration between donors is essential in order to learn from each other 
and to avoid duplication of effort 
Evaluation pro-
gramming 
— An overall plan must be developed by the agency for the evaluation of 
development 
Evaluation design 
and implementa-
tion 
— Each evaluation must be planned and terms of reference drawn up in order 
to: define the purpose and scope of the evaluation; describe the methods to 
be used; identify the standards; determine the resources and time required. 
Reporting, dis-
semination and 
feedback 
— Dissemination and feedback must form a continuous and dynamic part of 
the evaluation process. 
 
Source: (Danida 2006a, 2) 
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The process for implementing the “New Approach” is divided into four steps: 
1) Development and agreement on normative frameworks for assessing independ-
ence, credibility and use of evaluation evidence; 
2) Collection of data, and its analysis, against these normative frameworks; 
3) Agreement reached on the accuracy of the evidence and findings against  
the frameworks; and 
4) Development of conclusions and recommendations 
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